Literature Review Sample: China’s Increasing Deterrence Capabilities: The Impact on Sino-American Relations and Regional Disputes

1. Deterrence Definitions and China’s Changing Deterrence Policies

Deterrence is usually defined as an instrument of international relations preventing potential adversaries from attacking a country or engaging in aggressive actions against it (Michaels, 2024; Obradovic & Black, 2020; Weiner, 2023). This is achieved by instilling the fear of consequences or doubt through the demonstration of military capabilities and the formulation of possible retaliation strategies. The latter may include diplomatic, economic, and other actions inflicting harm upon the attacking country and creating adverse consequences for it. With that being said, this instrument can be applied to multiple actors, including terrorist groups or political entities, by demonstrating the signals of defensive intent, which may include the potential use of nuclear weapons and other military assets (Hood, 2023; Smetana & Onderco, 2023). The majority of definitions highlight the balancing aspect of this strategy, where one actor convinces the other one that their anticipated gains will be outweighed by retaliatory consequences (Malksoo, 2021). One of the most notable examples of deterrence application was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, where the US and the Soviet Union voiced mutual threats in a series of escalations, which led to the removal of missile units from several key territories.

With that being said, the use of deterrence can be associated with several problematic implications. On the one hand, it can create an ‘escalation ladder’ forcing the adversary to respond with greater threats (Filippidou, 2020; Malksoo, 2024). This trend was seen during the Cold War, leading to the economic exhaustion of the Soviet Union due to its military competition with the US. In this aspect, associations such as NATO or AUKUS present a more reasonable supporting structure for using deterrence, since they rely on the aggregate power of multiple states rather than a single one (Lupovici, 2023; Rahman, 2022). On the other hand, there exists a debate where denial-based deterrence strategies are contrasted by punishment-based ones (Johnson & Joiner, 2021). In the case of nuclear power such as China, this creates two possible visions where adversaries can be discouraged from unwanted activities by preventive actions or by the threat of inflicting greater damage in return. The latter strategy usually relates to nuclear-based deterrence, involving the idea of massive retaliation where a single attack against a country will trigger an asymmetric nuclear response.

In the case of China, the country utilised military force in multiple disputes, including the conflict with Korea in 1950, the border disputes with India in 1961-1962 and the Soviet Union in 1968-1969, and the conflict in northern Vietnam in 1979 (Jisi, 2024; Moore & Button, 2020; Schindler et al., 2024). Presently, deterrence is used in territorial claims in the East and South China Seas that contain critical transport routes for this country, as well as the Taiwan Strait (Raymond & Welch, 2022). Military drills are regularly organised in these areas, with their scope being frequently called ‘unreasonable provocation’ by the authorities of neighbouring countries. China is also expanding its presence in the Melanesian arc by seeking diplomatic relationships with countries from this region and winning over their allegiance (Wallis et al., 2022). Recent developments in this sphere include a security treaty with the Solomon Islands that potentially involves the construction of Chinese military bases in this area. Such expansions grant China access to seas and oceans with a strong presence of US fleets and the fleets of US partners and shift the balance of power in these territories (Nguyen et al., 2024; Welburn et al., 2023).

Additionally, China has strong capabilities for non-military forms of deterrence, including economic pressures (Khanal & Zhang, 2024; Rahman, 2022). Its ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) involves infrastructural investments supporting developing countries in all regions of potential interest. With local governments becoming indebted to one of the greatest global economies, this gives China powerful leverage for economic and diplomatic deterrence. Some of such countries may support its claims related to Taiwan and other areas of interest in the future due to their voting power in various global structures (Deng, 2021; Smetana & Onderco, 2023). It can also be noted that China has multiple territories of interest in nearby seas, as well as long-term territorial disputes with India. Both countries have nuclear weapons and comparable military assets. However, their previous confrontation was limited to an armed forces border standoff in 2017 lasting for 73 days, as well as multiple smaller skirmishes in several disputed areas, including the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Pangong Lake (Chan & Lee, 2023). These clashes overlapped with economic deterrence measures on the part of both sides, with the Indian government banning some Chinese firms and products and China imposing several symmetrical trade bans.

Overall, it can be summarised that China’s deterrence policies have evolved from the use of land army units in the 1960s to the use of nuclear weapons combined with advanced air, missile, and naval forces supported by economic, political, and diplomatic leverage (Dill et al., 2022; Elbahy, 2019; Egeland, 2020). While the use of force throughout the previous several decades was relatively limited in comparison with the 1960-1990s period, the country relies on ‘soft power’ and the Belt and Road Initiative as a way of promoting its interests on a global scale. Additionally, its technological advancement also allowed it to develop strong cyber deterrence capabilities, presumably relying on state-sponsored hacker groups (Creemers, 2024). These assets are unique to this country and can be seen as a major support of its military assets in an increasingly connected world. Successful past attacks, including Operation Aurora in 2010, the New York Times breach of 2013, the US Office of Personnel Management in 2015, the Equifax breach of 2017, and the easyJet data theft of 2020, demonstrate the capabilities of Chinese hackers in attacking both government agencies and private companies (Welburn et al., 2023; Deng, 2021;). This demonstration of power can be seen as an additional form of denial deterrence, convincing smaller countries lacking strong cybersecurity defence to avoid conflicts with China.

2. Chinese Deterrence Capabilities and Sino-American Relations

With China having approximately 20 nuclear missile delivery systems in the 1990s, the present-day estimations of the Pentagon appraise the current numbers of its nuclear warheads at 400+, with this figure being expected to triple by 2035 (Cheng, 2021; Hiim, 2024; Mount, 2024). In combination with multiple army reforms and the expansion of naval fleets, the growing strategic deterrence capabilities of this state have inevitably shifted the balance of power in many regions of its presence. With the US being an undisputed leader in global military power, this may pose a challenge to this domination (Kulacki, 2023; Chan & Lee, 2023). Additionally, the latest developments in political discussions between these countries can be appraised as problematic, with the China-US Trade War and sanctions against Huawei and other Chinese companies increasing the rivalry between these states (Liu & Woo, 2018; Welburn et al., 2023). One of the main problems with the increasing deterrence capabilities of the analysed country is associated with the fact that its interests in the East and South China Seas, Taiwan, offshore islands, Korea, and Vietnam represent its crucial strategic problems directly related to its national sovereignty and territorial integrity (Lim, 2022). Additionally, all of these territories can be easily accessed by the coordinated Chinese military forces, including ground, naval, and air forces, much faster than international forces including the US can intervene.

On the contrary, US support of other actors in these areas such as the provision of nuclear submarines to Australia within the AUKUS treaty are not directly linked with US strategic interests or national security challenges (Bisley, 2024; Imannurdin et al., 2024; McDougall, 2023). In this aspect, China has a stronger standing, since the involvement of the United States in such disputes may be seen as a direct challenge to its sovereignty, because the US does not have a legitimate obligation to do so. Moreover, the analysed country is using maritime routes for trade and import of critical resources including oil, which gives it a well-substantiated reason for expanding its presence in the East and South China Seas, as well as the Melanesian arc (Cox et al., 2023). It should also be noted that China has been expanding both its naval deterrence capabilities as a form of denial-based deterrence and its People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) capabilities, including both conventional and nuclear missiles (Gill & Ni, 2019). In 2021, a new plan was introduced in this sphere to expand already vast silo fields and create assets exceeding those of key competitors in this sphere.

These developments inevitably influence Sino-American relations and the balance of power between the two nations (Kristensen et al., 2024; Lim, 2022). Disputes between these states date back to the Korean War of 1950 and the first Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954 (Pasandideh, 2021). In both cases, China’s deterrence capabilities turned out to be significantly lower than those of its adversaries, which forced the country to accept the demands of its opponents. With that being said, the first atomic tests were run by China in 1964, with further evolution of national security reaching Xi Jinping’s current paradigm including 16 main types of security types (Puranen & Kopra, 2023). They include political elements as the ‘bedrock’ of the overall strategy, with economic elements serving as its ‘basis’. This vision is different from the purely military deterrence vision, since it gives China powerful economic leverage in negotiations. As a result, strong international relationships, including trade agreements, can help it promote its interests by combining different types of pressures (Jing & Jing, 2023). From the standpoint of Sino-American relations, this forces the US to engage in competition in both international partnerships and military capabilities.

The aforementioned tensions re-emerged during the late 2010s and the early 2020s as the Trump Administration raised trade tariffs and sanctioned multiple Chinese companies within the scope of the US-China Trade War (Fan et al., 2024; Liu & Woo, 2018). These conflicts were further intensified by the support of Hong Kong protesters, closed consulates, diplomatic comments about Uyghurs, the diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympics, the war in Ukraine, and Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Additionally, China accused the US of provoking a new nuclear arms race due to the creation of AUKUS and the controversies surrounding nuclear-powered submarine deals (Barnes & Makinda, 2022; Shifrinson, 2018). According to it, Australia may receive 3-5 Virginia-class units that could substantially weaken the deterrence capabilities of China. In line with the earlier discussed worldviews, this move is not directly associated with the protection of US interests and represents an asymmetrical situation where the analysed country has direct and immediate involvement in the problem as opposed to its political opponents (Lim, 2022). The insular state of China’s opponents and the long distance of its national borders raise questions about both the need for and the viability of engagement in standoff scenarios or denial deterrence with it (Kristensen et al., 2024).

These considerations can be further intensified by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine (Smetana & Onderco, 2023; Vihmand-Veebel & Veebel, 2023). This military intervention can be seen as an example of denial-based deterrence on the part of Russia, where this country attacked its neighbour to prevent the presumed expansion of NATO’s influence in the east. Additionally, Russia voiced threats regarding punishment-based deterrence involving the launch of nuclear missiles against any foreign country that would directly interfere in its operations in Ukraine with its military forces (Smetana & Onderco, 2023). With this conflict lasting for more than two years with relatively limited consequences for this state, this may be recognised as a sign that similar tactics can be applied by China. This country has comparable nuclear assets, as well as a large number of similar territorial disputes, including Taiwan (Pasandideh, 2021; Chan & Lee, 2023). Since global organisations, including the UK as well as the United States and NATO, did not provide a strong coordinated response in the current situation, this could mean that no similar response would be provided if China intervenes in some disputed territories to strengthen its national security and global position (Kulacki, 2023; Welburn et al., 2023). This pattern in international relationships is radically different from the scenarios of Sino-American relations in the 1960s, when the US had substantial leverage in diplomatic, military, and economic domains.

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