The Consequences of the Rise of the Far Right in Europe: The Indications for the Future of the EU
Introduction
This thesis explores the consequences of the rise of the far-right in Europe, exploring the indications of this political phenomenon for the future of the European Union (EU). Across Europe, far-right political parties are becoming increasingly popular and entering mainstream political discourse. Their popularity is reflected in elections, in how they help to shape the policies of mainstream right-wing parties, and in how far-right politicians now occupy select ministerial roles in coalition governments. For example, Giorgia Meloni, whose party has neofascist roots, is the Prime Minister of Italy, while the far-right is now part of the coalition government in Finland (Henley, 2023). Europe’s far-right parties share a popularist rhetoric and an emphasis on national sovereignty and policies. Such policies promote a ‘national preference’ leading academics to dub this phenomenon as ‘the new nationalism’ (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2019, p.409). The new nationalism is triggered by cultural grievances fuelled by resistance to an emerging transnational consciousness, indicating that the popularity of the far-right is due to its nationalist appeal and a cultural unease with foreign influence on political and economic affairs.
Background
The rise of far-right, nationalist, and popularist parties has been noticeable since 2014 when the European elections saw the rise of parties labelled ‘popularist’ across the EU (Benveniste et al., 2016). Some examples include Slovenia’s Slovenska demokratska stranka, the UK’s UKIP, Denmark’s Dansk Folskeparti, France’s Front National, the Five Star Movement in Italy, Greece’s Golden Dawn, and Austria’s FPO. These parties and other far-right political forces are believed to have transformed the European Parliament and challenged, at some level, the hegemony of the four main political parties that dominate the political body (Benveniste et al., 2016). The rise of these parties challenges the centre-left consensus that European institutions rely on to pass progressive policy and maintain the status quo. It also raises questions regarding the role of ethnic identity and migration in European societies and whether distrust of migration and ethnic minorities could lead to conflict in future (Davis and Deole, 2017).
Rise of the Far-Right and the Future of the EU
Recently, the rise of the far-right has come to threaten the course the EU will take in future. Across the EU, between 6 and 9 June 2024, just under 400 million people voted in the European Parliamentary elections to elect 720 MEPs. These elections are important, as they allow EU citizens to decide who represents them in the European Parliament and begin negotiations for the new president of the European Commission, the body that proposes legislation and policies for the EU (Van Rij et al., 2024). In the June 2024 elections, far-right political parties did make significant gains but did not do as well as anticipated. The far-right’s main gains were in France, Italy, and Germany, but they failed to do so across the rest of the EU. Far-right parties came first in five countries, and second or third in another five, mainly at the expense of green and liberal parties (Van Rij et al., 2024). As of yet, there has been no ‘surge’ toward the right; however, long-term trends dating back from 2014 demonstrate that across the EU there is ongoing support for anti-establishment, Eurosceptic, and popularist parties at both local and national levels.
Van Rij et al. (2024) suggests that far-right parties may struggle to unite across borders in the European Parliament, as they are strongly individualistic and nationalistic by nature. Also, the authors observe that the level of engagement of far-right parties in the European Parliament have been low in the past. However, far-right parties have made their mark on migration policy. For example, the most recent migration policies of the European People’s Party (EPP), a centre-right party that holds the most seats in the European Parliament, indicate it has adopted far-right policy positions on tacking illegal immigration. The policies of the EPP regarding migration are to increase controls at international borders within the EU so that they are ‘comprehensively and electronically’ maintained (Roth, 2024). This example demonstrates that the rising influence of the far-right in Europe is as much indirect as it is direct as, noticing the popularity of far-right parties and policies, more centralist parties are likely to adopt and enact some of their policies to win votes.
That far-right policy has come to influence and inform the immigration policies of more mainstream political parties is significant. Prior to the significant rise in votes for far-right parties in the 2014 European elections, the immigration share of the European population rose considerably. Between 2002 and 2014, the immigrant population rose significantly in many European countries, with growth exceeding 50 percent for several countries during this period (Davis and Deole, 2017). This finding implies that if European parties can adopt some far-right policies, they may be able to save the EU and other European institutions.
Another area on which may far-right parties are united is green policies. Many far-right parties across Europe are opposed to green policies. While the EU has expressed a desire to be ahead of the rest of the world in terms of environmental policy, voters are concerned about the cost of a green transition (Adler, 2024). Nationalist parties have jumped on this bandwagon, with such parties in France, Poland, and the Netherlands supporting anti-environmental policies that aim to support the rights of farmers and other professions and businesses affected by pro-green policies (Adler, 2024).
Research Approach
This research utilises a mixed method approach. Theory will be used alongside primary and secondary research into the political phenomena discussed to explore and understand the rise of the far-right in Europe and the impact of that. One example of the kind of theory that could be useful in this context is the idea of the umbrella concept, which has recently been explored as a means of considering the boundaries between the (popularist) radical right and the extreme right (Pirro, 2023). Such theory might be applied to explain how the far-right conceptualises its policies toward Europe and the EU and how this might impact the future of shared European institutions.
References
Adler, K., (2024), ‘The Far Right could make Big Gains in EU Elections. What would that mean? BBC In Depth. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cv22vne9x03o (Accessed 1 Aug 2024).
Benveniste, A., Campani, G., and Lazaridis, G., (2016), ‘Introduction,’ in Lazaridis, G., Campani, G., and Benveniste, A., eds., The Rise of the Far Right in Europe: Populist Shifts in ‘Othering.’ New York: Springer.
Davis, L., and Deole, S.S., (2017), ‘Immigration and the Rise of Far-Right Parties in Europe.’ Econstor, 15 (4), pp.10-15.
Halikiopoulou, D., and Vlandas, T., (2019), ‘What is New and What is Nationalist about Europe’s New Nationalism? Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Europe.’ Nations and Nationalism, 25 (2), pp.409-434.
Henley, J., (2023), ‘How Europe’s Far Right is Marching Steadily into the Mainstream.’ The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/30/far-right-on-the-march-europe-growing-taste-for-control-and-order (Accessed 1 Aug 2024).
Pirro, A.L.P., (2023), ‘Far Right: The Significance of an Umbrella Concept.’ Nations and Nationalism, 29 (1), pp.101-112.
Roth, C., (2024), ‘European Parliament Election: Party Stances on Migration.’ Info Migrants. https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/57114/european-parliament-election-party-stances-on-migration (Accessed 1 Aug 2024).
Van Rij, A., Benton, T., Butler, C., and Schroder, P., (2024), ‘How will Gains by the Far Right affect the European Parliament and EU?’ Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/06/how-will-gains-far-right-affect-european-parliament-and-eu (Accessed 1 Aug 2024).
